Artificial intelligence (AI) systems in high-stakes domains raise concerns about proxy discrimination, unfairness, and explainability. Existing audits often fail to reveal why unfairness arises, particularly when rooted in structural bias. We propose a novel framework using formal abductive explanations to explain proxy discrimination in individual AI decisions. Leveraging background knowledge, our method identifies which features act as unjustified proxies for protected attributes, revealing hidden structural biases. Central to our approach is the concept of aptitude, a task-relevant property independent of group membership, with a mapping function aligning individuals of equivalent aptitude across groups to assess fairness substantively. As a proof of concept, we showcase the framework with examples taken from the German credit dataset, demonstrating its applicability in real-world cases.

Neural Information Processing Systems http://nips.cc/

Recent work on fairness in machine learning has focused on various statistical discrimination criteria and how they trade off. Most of these criteria are observational: They depend only on the joint distribution of predictor, protected attribute, features, and outcome. While convenient to work with, observational criteria have severe inherent limitations that prevent them from resolving matters of fairness conclusively. Going beyond observational criteria, we frame the problem of discrimination based on protected attributes in the language of causal reasoning. This viewpoint shifts attention from "What is the right fairness criterion?" to "What do we want to assume about our model of the causal data generating process?" Through the lens of causality, we make several contributions. First, we crisply articulate why and when observational criteria fail, thus formalizing what was before a matter of opinion. Second, our approach exposes previously ignored subtleties and why they are fundamental to the problem. Finally, we put forward natural causal non-discrimination criteria and develop algorithms that satisfy them.

Emerging scholarship suggests that the EU legal concept of direct discrimination - where a person is given different treatment on grounds of a protected characteristic - may apply to various algorithmic decision-making contexts. This has important implications: unlike indirect discrimination, there is generally no 'objective justification' stage in the direct discrimination framework, which means that the deployment of directly discriminatory algorithms will usually be unlawful per se. In this paper, we focus on the most likely candidate for direct discrimination in the algorithmic context, termed inherent direct discrimination, where a proxy is inextricably linked to a protected characteristic. We draw on computer science literature to suggest that, in the algorithmic context, 'treatment on the grounds of' needs to be understood in terms of two steps: proxy capacity and proxy use. Only where both elements can be made out can direct discrimination be said to be `on grounds of' a protected characteristic. We analyse the legal conditions of our proposed proxy capacity and proxy use tests. Based on this analysis, we discuss technical approaches and metrics that could be developed or applied to identify inherent direct discrimination in algorithmic decision-making.

Indirect discrimination is an issue of major concern in algorithmic models. This is particularly the case in insurance pricing where protected policyholder characteristics are not allowed to be used for insurance pricing. Simply disregarding protected policyholder information is not an appropriate solution because this still allows for the possibility of inferring the protected characteristics from the non-protected ones. This leads to so-called proxy or indirect discrimination. Though proxy discrimination is qualitatively different from the group fairness concepts in machine learning, these group fairness concepts are proposed to 'smooth out' the impact of protected characteristics in the calculation of insurance prices. The purpose of this note is to share some thoughts about group fairness concepts in the light of insurance pricing and to discuss their implications. We present a statistical model that is free of proxy discrimination, thus, unproblematic from an insurance pricing point of view. However, we find that the canonical price in this statistical model does not satisfy any of the three most popular group fairness axioms. This seems puzzling and we welcome feedback on our example and on the usefulness of these group fairness axioms for non-discriminatory insurance pricing.

I've interviewed and hired (or not) many engineers for both large and small tech companies. Most hired worked out well; I found a few gems. I also hired a few sources of grief. The cost of a poor hire is quite high. Even in "at will" states--those that allow employers to remove an employee without cause--the process is long and expensive (largely to forestall lawsuits).

Recent work on fairness in machine learning has focused on various statistical discrimination criteria and how they trade off. Most of these criteria are observational: They depend only on the joint distribution of predictor, protected attribute, features, and outcome. While convenient to work with, observational criteria have severe inherent limitations that prevent them from resolving matters of fairness conclusively. Going beyond observational criteria, we frame the problem of discrimination based on protected attributes in the language of causal reasoning. This viewpoint shifts attention from "What is the right fairness criterion?" to "What do we want to assume about our model of the causal data generating process?" Through the lens of causality, we make several contributions. First, we crisply articulate why and when observational criteria fail, thus formalizing what was before a matter of opinion. Second, our approach exposes previously ignored subtleties and why they are fundamental to the problem. Finally, we put forward natural causal non-discrimination criteria and develop algorithms that satisfy them.

Recent work on fairness in machine learning has focused on various statistical discrimination criteria and how they trade off. Most of these criteria are observational: They depend only on the joint distribution of predictor, protected attribute, features, and outcome. While convenient to work with, observational criteria have severe inherent limitations that prevent them from resolving matters of fairness conclusively. Going beyond observational criteria, we frame the problem of discrimination based on protected attributes in the language of causal reasoning. This viewpoint shifts attention from "What is the right fairness criterion?" to "What do we want to assume about our model of the causal data generating process?" Through the lens of causality, we make several contributions. First, we crisply articulate why and when observational criteria fail, thus formalizing what was before a matter of opinion. Second, our approach exposes previously ignored subtleties and why they are fundamental to the problem. Finally, we put forward natural causal non-discrimination criteria and develop algorithms that satisfy them.